Abstract. This paper describes efficient protocols for multi-party computations that are information-theoretically secure against passive attacks. The results presented here apply to access structures based on quorum systems, which are collections of sets enjoying a naturallymotivated self-intersection property. Quorum-based access structures include threshold systems but are far richer and more general, and they have specific applicability to several problems in distributed control and management. The achievable limits of security in quorum-based multiparty computation are shown to be equivalent to those determined by Hirt and Maurer in [HM97], drawing a natural but non-obvious connection between quorum systems and the extremes of secure multi-party computation. Moreover, for both the general case and for specific applications, the protocols presented here are simpler and more efficient.
Introduction

Overview
Multi-party computation -a means for groups to engage in joint computation as though an absolutely trusted third party were available to help them -has enjoyed a great deal of attention for several years, with much effort spent on exploring the limits of robustness and efficiency [GMW86, GMW87, GHY88, BGW88, CCD88, RB89, Beaglb, BG89, BH92, DDFY94, CFGN961. Virtually without exception, all solutions have been based on threshold secret sharing, and hence they are themselves threshold-oriented. Recently, Hirt and Maurer characterized tolerable adversary sets in general multi-party computations without restriction to purely threshold-based sets [HM97]. Our work explores and expands on a non-threshold-based approach to multi-party computation, investigating quorum-based multi-party protocols and providing more efficient solutions for general and specific cases. Whom to Trust. The general motivation for multi-party computation is simple: apply a decentralized approach to ensure robustness and security in joint computations, increasing reliability by dissipating trust among many individuals.
Formally, a collection of n players wish to compute some function f(x1, . . . , z, ) of their respective, private inputs, revealing the final result but nothing more. Ideally, they could resort to a trusted third party to collect the inputs and return Part of this work was done at the DIMACS Research & Education Institute Cryptography and Network Security Workshop (DREI'97), August 1997. only the result; the goal of secure multi-party computation is to achieve the same task without the existence of any such helper. Threshold Schemes. Multi-party protocols are typically based on secret sharing. In the past virtually all of them relied on some form of Shamir's polynomialbased sharing scheme [Sha79, Bla791. Because these sharing schemes are threshold based -i.e., reconstruction of a secret depends on having some minimal number of shares, rather than some particular set of players -there is a natural limit on the types of dishonest coalitions that can be tolerated by multi-party computations. In particular, an honest majority is necessary and sufficient for verifiable sharing and multi-party computation [RB89, BeaSlb] -for threshold-based protocols. Conversely, as long as no dishonest coalition exceeds the threshold of size 1 secure multi-party computation is achievable. This characterization of tolerable adversaries is natural, elegant, and seemingly all that needs be said. Weighted Threshold Schemes. The simplest generalization involves a weighted approach, in which important players (such as CEO's and VP's) are essentially granted more shares of the secret than the peons. The characterization of tolerable adversaries remains simple; the weighted collection of shares held by honest players (resp. dishonest players) must be a majority (resp. minority) of all shares. Thus the characterization of what is achievable needs only slight modification. A disadvantage of such a weighted approach is that the important players have more shares so they need to perform more of the computational work. Quorum Systems. The approach we take here is motivated by distributed control and management problems such a s mutual exclusion (cf. [GB85] ), data replication protocols (cf. [DGS85, Her841) and name servers (cf. [MV88]). In these applications certain operations are allowed only if they are authorized by a set of members which is defined to be a quorum. The requirement from the quorum sets is that every two quorums should have at least one member in common. The existence of a common member helps prevent uncoordinated action between two different groups, whether that action be committing to a newly-written value or returning the latest version. Clearly, any threshold system (weighted or not) whose threshold exceeds half the total population (or weight) qualifies as a quorum system: the pigeonhole principle ensures that any two threshold-passing sets will intersect nontrivially. Adding Security. Secret sharing schemes for arbitrary access structures have been developed by Ito, Saito, and Nishizeki [ISN87]. Schemes for structures represented by monotone formulas were proposed by Benaloh and Leichter [BL88]. More recently, Naor and Wool have designed schemes for structures which represent specific quorum systems [NW96] . The natural question to ask is whether these sharing schemes are usable for multi-party computations as well. We answer this question in the affirmative, and present several new protocols that use quorum-based secret sharing schemes. In the process we also present some new quorum secret-sharing schemes which we utilize in the protocols. Thus we are able to support non-threshold access structures without resorting to weighted threshold schemes. This allows us to escape the "honest majority" barrier to some degree -our protocols can tolerate some dishonest majorities of players. However, this comes at a price: the protocols cannot tolerate certain dishonest minorities.
Attack Model. In this work we focus on passive attacks, in which all the players follow the protocol. However, dishonest players may pool their information in order to learn some of the secret inputs of other players (this is sometimes called the "honest but curious" model). The adversary is only permitted to choose a dishonest coalition from the collection of coalitions that the protocol tolerates (these will be the complements of quorum sets). On the other hand, our security requirement is of the strongest type: that a dishonest coalition can learn nothing about the other's secret inputs, in the information-theoretic sense. Efficiency. Once the security of a protocol has been established, we are intercsted in two measures of its quality: the number of messages sent per multiplication, which captures the communication complexity of the protocol; and the size of the shares each player holds, which captures the amount of local computation each player needs to perform.
Connecting multi-party computation and quorum systems
Multi-party computation protocols have traditionally been defined and analyzed in terms of the collection B of bad coalitions that they tolerate. For instance, for a threshold-based protocol this collection is of the form "all the sets of cardinality less than t." Early on it was discovered that there is a simple combinatorial condition which precludes the existence of any protocol that tolerates certain types of B's. The Recently Hirt and Maurer showed that the converse of Lemma 1 is also true (for honest-but-curious attacks), by describing a general protocol which tolerates any collection B that does not 2-cover U . Their protocol involves a recursive decomposition of the bad collection B into 3 sub-collections, and simulating the 2-of-3 threshold-based protocol of [BGW88] at each level of the recursion. Thus they proved the following characterization. Therefore multi-party protocols are characterized equivalently by the quorum systems that they respect and by the bad coalitions they tolerate. However, focusing on the positive, quorum-based view leads naturally to the use of quorum secret sharing schemes, which form the foundation for our new protocols.
Contributions
Our first result is a new secure multi-party protocol which respects any arbitrary quorum system (and hence tolerates any collection of bad coalitions that does not 2-cover U ) . By this we show an alternative proof to the characterization of Hirt and Maurer [HM97]. However our protocol is much more efficient; for a system of n players and m minimal quorums our protocol sends O(n2m) messages per multiplication, as compared to the f2(m2.709) messages sent by Hirt and Maurer's protoc01.~ Note that in general m = 2n(n), so it is of far greater importance t o reduce the dependence on m. Moreover, our protocol is much simpler to describe and to analyze, since it involves neither recursion nor simulation of subprotocols.
We also describe several multi-party protocols which are based on specific quorum systems. The quorum systems that we consider were devised for various distributed control mechanisms and are shown (in the referenced papers) to have favorable properties such as high availability and low load [NW94]. The quorum systems we consider are the crumbling wall quorum systems of [PW97], the finite projective plane (FPP) quorum system of [Mae85], and the 2-of-3 majority-tree systems of [AE91] and [Kumgl] . The protocols we provide for these systems are all fully polynomial in n, with a complexity of O(n2) messages per multiplication. Thus to our knowledge they are the first non-threshold protocols which are as efficient as the original protocol of [BGW88, CCDSS] .
For the crumbling walls and tree-based systems we use the secret sharing schemes proposed in [NW96] . In the former scheme the shares are twice the size of the secrets, while the latter is optimal ( i e . , the size of the shares equals the size of the secret). For the FPP system we present a new optimal secret sharing scheme, which may be interesting in its own right. Thus the local computations that the players perform in all these protocols are extremely efficient, typically consisting of a constant number of multiplications and a linear number of additions and random bit generations. Organization: In $2 we define quorum systems, secret scharing schemes, and secure multi-party computation. In 53 we present our general quorum-based protocol for arbitrary quorum systems. $4 describes our efficient (polynomial in n) protocols for special quorum systems.
In their paper Hirt and Maurer only claim that their protocol is polynomial in rn. We provide a more detailed complexity analysis for their algorithm in the sequel. We use n = I U I to denote the number of players. Unless otherwise noted, the quorums in all the quorum systems mentioned in this paper are minimal: Qi Q j for every two quorums Q i , Q j E Q. We use m = 1Q1 to denote the number of (minimal) quorums.
Definition5. An access specification is a disjoint pair (G,B) of collections of subsets, such that G is monotone increasing (that is, 
G ( Q ) , B ( Q ) ) .
R e m a r k : Quorum systems whose access specification is unambiguous have many interesting properties. Such systems have attracted attention in several contexts, and much is known about them. The terminology associated with these systems differs from discipline to discipline, and a non-comprehensive list of names includes "non-dominated coterie" [GB85] ; "simple decisive game" 
Secret s h a r i n g
Definition 7. Let 
where the probability is taken over the random string r.
Multi-party computation
The following formalizations are standard and based on commonly accepted approaches [GMR89, BGW88, CCD88, Beagla, MR911. Let C be a circuit over logical (or finite arithmetical) gates, having n inputs and one ~u t p u t ,~ and let generally discuss the passive case, we identify adversaries with sets of observed players.) A partial S-view of an execution is the set of strings describing internal computations, random tosses, and input-output transcripts for players in S, up t o some given round of interaction. We often overload the term view to mean a specific string in a given execution, the distribution on strings over all executions, or the partial view a t some moment, as convenience dictates. An execution of a protocol is characterized by a result-vector of n outputs along with the final view of the adversary.
Let simulator S be given an adversary B as input and have access to an ideal protocol in which a trusted, external party collects the inputs z1, . . . ,z, and returns the result, f(z1,. . . , z,). In addition to providing progressive partial B-views, the simulator produces a final result-vector (whose adversary-view is the concatenation of the progressive partial B-views). 
Definitions
is said t o be Q-private if it securely implements the quorum access specification (G(Q), B(Q)).
This is easily generalized to multiple and private outputs.
The preceding commentary is easily generalized to families of functions. A finite set of protocols is compEete for some function family if it enables sharing and reconstruction, and through finite composition can evaluate any finite circuit securely. Our approach is standard [GMW86, BGW88, CCD88]: to provide efficient protocols for sharing, reconstruction, addition (linear combination), and multiplication.
A general protocol
In this section we present a general multi-party protocol which is Q-private for any quorum system Q. Let Q be a quorum system, and let C be a circuit which computes a function f . To describe a Q-private protocol which computes f, we need first to show a secret sharing scheme that realizes (G(Q)lB(Q)). Then it suffices to show how the players can compute sums and products Q-privately using the shares. The computation of f is performed by simulating the circuit C gate by gate.
3.1
Consider a quorum system Q = (01,. . . , Qm} of minimal quorums, and let z be the value to be shared. First z is represented randomly as a sum-share z = C;, xj. This can be done by assigning uniformly chosen random values to z j for j = 1,. . . , m -1 and assigning zm = z -Cj=l z j . We call the values z1 , . . . , zm the parts of z to differentiate them from the shares of the scheme.
The share s U ( z ) of player u is the set of parts corresponding to the quorums that contain u:
The Gen-SSS secret sharing scheme
Proposition 12. G e n -S S S is a secret sharing scheme realizing the q u o r u m access specification (g(Q)l S ( Q ) ) .
Proof: Consider some set G E G ( Q ) which contains the quorum Qi E Q. By the intersection property, Qi n Q j # 0 for all j = 1,. . . ,m, so for every quorum Qj there exists a player u E Qi which has the corresponding part z j . Therefore the players in Qi collectively have all the parts {zj}zl and can reconstruct the secret x.
Now consider a set B E B(Q). Then by definition there exists some quorum
Qi E Q such that Qi C U \ B . Only members of Qi receive the part xi, and therefore no player in B has xi.
Let tX be a specific assignment of Gen-SSS shares which encodes a secret 
The Gen-MP protocol
The Gen-MP protocol for evaluating a circuit obliviously is the direct composition of protocols for linear combination and multiplication, described below. It is easy to see that the new s,(z) shares are valid Gen-SSS shares for z , and since the computation did not involve the exchange of any messages the computation is Q-private.
Computing a linear combination
Computing a product As before let x = C,"=, xj and y = C:==, y j be shared among the players according to Gen-SSS. The players aim to compute the prod- 
1. Player u locally computes the sum of all the terms she is in charge of wu + C xiyj.
i , j ; p ( i , j ) = u 2. Player u secret-shares the value w, among all the players using the Gen-SSS scheme. Namely, u computes a randomized sum-share version of wu by w, = Cj"=, w,j, and sends the part wuj to every player v IS Q j . 
After player u receives the parts
Proof:
We wish to show that the information gained by B is no different than if the input pieces were given to a trusted party who reconstructs x and y then shares xy. It suffices to provide a simulator that can construct a perfectly accurate view for B using only the z-shares returned to B by such a trusted party. By definition there exists some quorum Q E Q that is untainted, namely Q fl B = 8. Note, incidentally, that the trivial case in which Q is of size 1 is easily dealt with -the single, uncorrupted party behaves as a trusted monarch and the protocol collapses, securely.
Let P(B) = {k : QkflB # 0) be the collection of (indices of) tainted quorums.
Consider an n xm table of all the wuj values appearing in the protocol, whose row sums correspond to the players' w, values and whose column sums correspond to the final zj parts. Define the compromised region in this table to be is not included in B's view, nor are {w,},~B. We describe how to simulate an execution and then show that the fake view can be modified as needed when constraints on x , y or xy are made.
(1) Using the partial inputs {~j , y j }~~p (~) , we first calculate {w,},~B directly. We run "bad" players in B honestly on these values, deriving a perfectly accurate distribution for values {w,j} for all u E B and all j . The remaining compromised region lies in rows corresponding to uncompromised players. When the {zj}jEp(B) values are obtained from the imaginary trusted host, this compromised region is generated uniformly at random, subject to column constraints:
(2) In an actual execution, the values of {w,},g~ are determined by the input shares, then give rise to the sum-shares {wuj}, which B then partially observes ( i e . , those in W E ) . The values of {w,},~B are likewise determined by input shares, but also revealed to B. For j E P(B), the column sums are determined by values revealed to B ; for j P(B), the column sums include the uncompromised region, which is chosen uniformly at random (subject to row sums matching the uncompromised {w,},~B).
Observe ('hotably") that the second stage of experiment (1) is identical to setting arbitrary values in {w,},~B and then choosing the compromised region uniformly at random subject to row and column constraints. By the properties of sum-sharing, this in turn is equivalent to setting parts xi and yi for i $ ! P (B) to arbitrary values, executing honest programs on the results, and reporting only the compromised portion {~, j ) , e~, j E p (~) .
(The B-view for rows in B is clearly identical in both cases.)
Thus, experiments (1) and (2) provide identical distributions. As long as there exist appropriate settings to the uncompromised values, the "notable" observation (previous paragraph) that shows the distributions are identical continues to hold. Further, burdensome inspection shows that such settings always remain possible, even when B learns further information, as when the final output value is revealed or when gates are tied together in composition. (Indeed, B may be able to calculate some secrets and uncompromised entries along the way, even though it does not see them directly. The important point is that such entries can always be found when facing the simulated views.) Because m grows with the number of coalitions and is therefore generally exponential in the number of players, it is of far greater importance to reduce dependence on rn. Our protocol incurs only a linear factor of m, with a small polynomial term in n.
4 Efficient protocols for particular sharing schemes
The crumbling wall protocol
The Crumbling Walls (CW) are a family of quorum systems due to [PW97]. This family includes, among others, the CWlog system (see Figure 1) . The players in a wall are logically arranged in rows of varying widths. A quorum in a wall is the union of one full row and a representative from every row below the full row. The best crumbling walls are those in which the top row has width n1 = 1 and every other row has width n i 2 2. In [PW97] it is shown that such walls are non-dominated coteries, i. e., their quorum access specification is unambiguous (recall Definition 6). Note that many of the quorums in a crumbling wall are small minorities -in the wall depicted in Figure 1 the smallest quorums are of size O(1og n).
The CW-SSS secret sharing scheme Our multi-party protocol is based on the following secret sharing scheme, called CW-SSS, due to [NW96] . Consider a wall CW of d rows, with row 1 having width 721 = 1 and ni 2 2 for all i 2 2. The basic secret unit s is a single bit, therefore all the arithmetic in this section is over GF(2). This secret s is first randomly split into d bits such that a1 +. .
Using these ai bits we can define their partial parities, ti e a1 + . . . + ai-1, and A quorum Q, which contains a full row i and a representative in each row k > i can reconstruct the secret bit s from the shares { s i } generated by s = (CyLi
The CW-MP protocol Let secret z be shared using pieces ( u i , A f ) and let secret y be shared using (bi,Bj). Linear combinations ( z = QZ +by) are trivial:
each player (i, j ) performs the operation locally on the corresponding pieces:
Multiplication is somewhat more complex, but it can be achieved through appropriate application of sum-sharing. We use (i, j ) to denote the j'th player in row i. t(i, Ic, j) to player (k, j) .
Computing parity of rows above: Player
Thereby each row i has secretly computed (without reconstruction) the sum-share of the partial parity c1 + . . . + ci-1.
The communication complexity of this protocol is clearly O ( n 2 ) bits and 0(1) rounds of message exchange.
Proposition 17. The preceding protocols securely compute shares of z = cux+/?y (resp., z = x ' y ) Q-privately according to the CW-SSS scheme.
4.2
In this section we describe an efficient O ( n 2 ) protocol for the case where the underlying quorum system is a finite projective plane (FPP) [Mae85] . For a prime T let t = r k for some integer lc. Then the finite projective plane of order t is a quorum system with n = t2 + t + 1 players and rn = t2 + t + 1 quorums of size t + 1. Moreover, each player is a member of t + 1 quorums, and the intersection of every two quorums consists of a single player.
Note that since n = m and the average quorum size q = J;; the general protocol of section 3 already has a polynomial message complexity of U ( n 2 , 5 ) for the F P P system. However, here we can use a much more efficient secret sharing scheme: The size of the share held by each player is 1 or 2, in comparison to the O(rn)-sized shares used in Gen-SSS. Thus the local computations in the FPP-MP protocol take constant time.
The FPP-SSS secret sharing scheme In this section all the arithmetic is performed in the ring Zt, where t is the order of the finite projective plane. Let x be the secret to be shared. As in Gen-SSS, x is represented randomly as a sum-share x = CjZ1 xj (mod t ) . Then the share of player u is the sum of the parts corresponding to the quorums that contain u:
The finite projective plane protocol m a,(x) t xj (mod t ) .
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Proposition 18. FPP-SSS is a secret sharing scheme realizing the quorum access specification (G(FPP), B ( F P P ) ) .
The FPP-MP protocol Assume that z and y are shared among the players according to the FPP-SSS scheme. In order to compute z = a x + B y Q-privately the players locally compute a,(z) t cyu,(z) + pa,(y). It is clear that the resultant shares are valid and no information was revealed by this computation.
To compute the product x y , each player u performs the following steps:
1. Player u locally computes the product w, t a, (x) . a,(y).
2.
Player u secret-shares the value w, among all the players using the FPP-SSS scheme. Namely, u computes a randomized sum-share version of w, by 
